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Does Capital Tax Uncertainty Delay Irreversible
Risky Investment?
Abstract
Tax uncertainty is often claimed to be harmful for investments. Capital taxes, such as
property and wealth taxes, are particularly exposed to tax uncertainty. Capital tax un-
certainty emerges from expected tax reforms, the unclear outcome of future tax audits,
and simplied estimates of capital tax bases in investment models. Uncertain returns on
investment as well as stochastic taxation contribute to overall uncertainty and may signif-
icantly a¤ect investment decisions. Hitherto, it is unknown how capital tax uncertainty
a¤ects investment timing. However, it is well known that both uncertainty and capital tax
may be harmful for investment and decelerate investment activities. We are the rst to
study the investment timing e¤ects of stochastic capital taxes in a real options setting with
risky investment opportunities. Our results indicate that even risk neutral investors are
sensitive with respect to capital tax risk and may react in a surprising manner to a newly
introduced stochastic capital tax. As an apparently paradoxical investment e¤ect, we nd
that increased capital tax uncertainty can accelerate risky investment if such uncertainty
is su¢ ciently low compared to cash ow uncertainty. In contrast, high capital tax risk
delays high-risk innovative investment projects. To reduce unintended consequences of
uncertain tax policy, tax legislators and tax authorities should avoid high levels of cap-
ital tax uncertainty. Broadening the capital tax base or increasing the capital tax rate
induces ambiguous timing e¤ects. Furthermore, high-growth investments are likely to
be postponed if they experience a capital tax cut. Since investment reactions upon tax
reforms are well-known to a¤ect income and wealth distribution, reliable estimations of
the impact of taxes on economic decisions are necessary.
JEL classication: H25; H21
Keywords: property tax, capital tax, investment decisions, real options, timing exibil-
ity, uncertainty
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Does Capital Tax Uncertainty Delay Irreversible
Risky Investment?
1 Introduction
Tax uncertainty is often claimed to be harmful for investments. Tax systems in most
jurisdictions include prot and capital taxation. Property, wealth and inheritance taxes
are prominent examples of capital taxes. For several reasons capital taxes in particular
contribute to tax uncertainty. A survey of 830 tax and nance executive in 25 jurisdictions
(EY 2014) shows that tax practitioners are particularly concerned about tax uncertainty:
... 85% of US-headquartered companies report they are experiencing more risk or
uncertainty around tax legislation or regulation than they were two years ago ... 81%
of all companies surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that tax risk and controversy
will become more important for their companies in the next two years. ... 82%
of all companies surveyed believe their tax function has signicant or adequate
involvement in the general business strategy and planning process.
As both tax risk in general and capital taxation are often claimed to be harmful for
investment (for empirical evidence see Dye, McGuire, and Merriman 2001, Allee, Lynch,
Petroni, and Schroeder 2015, Hoppe, Maiterth, and Sureth 2016) and are expected to
delay investment activities, we analyze the investment e¤ects of capital tax uncertainty.
Thus, we address the research question: How does uncertainty over (anticipated) capital
tax payments a¤ect investment timing decisions?
Capital tax uncertainty already exists if a tax reform discussion takes place. One promi-
nent example is the OECD action plan to curb tax base erosion and prot shifting (BEPS).
The OECD has recently published recommendations on how to determine the value of
intellectual property (IP) in a digital economy (OECD 2015a, Action 1). However, if IP
is subject to capital tax, neither do these recommendations answer all open valuation
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questions, nor do taxpayers know how the countries will implement these rules into their
national tax codes. As the share of IP in a companys overall wealth is growing, so does
capital tax uncertainty.
Furthermore, capital tax uncertainty arises from the unclear outcome of a future tax
audit, which is di¢ cult to predict as tax issues and tax law can be interpreted di¤erently
by taxpayers, scal authorities, tax auditors and tax courts. As tax laws are often too
complicated to be anticipated in detail, taxpayers may use simplied models of capital tax
bases in their investment decisions. Moreover, prospective investment projects sometimes
only provide relatively weak tax facts, which contributes to a high level of tax uncertainty
(for empirical evidence see Mills, Robinson, and Sansing, 2010; Lisowsky, Robinson, and
Schmidt, 2013). Whereas these types of tax uncertainty are not capital tax-specic, any
type of capital or property tax requires recognition and valuation of the respective assets,
which involves considerable uncertainty. Thus, property and wealth taxation especially
su¤er from valuation risk and often require single case assessments. Whenever the market
value of capitalcannot be derived from observable prices of recent sales, taxpayers and
scal authorities have to estimate the market value. The estimation of the value of a rm
in this context is particularly challenging as the cash ow that arises from entrepreneurial
and business activities is usually random (Müller, 2014). Furthermore, tax legislators often
introduce various di¤erent valuation methods and create tax base assessment uncertainty,
which contributes to total uncertainty. In summary, capital tax uncertainty exposure is
typically high and realized capital tax payments often appear random from an ex ante
perspective.
Despite the claim that capital taxes are harmful, we observe repeated calls for increases
in capital taxes such as the (re-) introduction of a general wealth tax (for example, IMF
2013, IMF 2014, Piketty 2014) or an increase in taxes on specic assets, such as real
estate. This is because capital taxes are often considered superior to prot taxation in
curbing tax evasion and serve both e¢ ciency and equality aims. Although several coun-
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tries abolished capital taxation during the 1990s and 2000s, there are animated political
debates on capital taxation for distributional and scal purposes, especially in industri-
alized countries. The following table lists selected countries that are currently discussing
or have recently discussed a (re-)introduction of a wealth tax or have conducted a wealth
tax reform.
Country trends in wealth taxation wealth tax in place reforms since 2004
Austria discussion since 2010 no
China discussion in 2015 no
France increase since 2012 max. 1.5% (individual) 3
Germany discussion since 2013 no
Greece discussion in 2015 no
Hungary discussion since 2010 no
Iceland
abolition in 2006
reintroduction in 2010, abolition in 2012
no 2
India abolition in 2015 no 3
Luxembourg reintroduction in 2014 0.5% (corporate) 2
Norway ongoing discussion max. 0.7% (individual) 3
Netherlands deemed income tax (box 3) 30% of a deemed 4% return
Spain abolition in 2007, reintroduction in 2012 max. 2.5% (individual) 5
Sweden abolition 2007 no
Switzerland/Zurich
discussion on abolition or decrease
in some cantons since 2007
max. 0.657% (individual)
0.164% (corporate)
3
United Kingdom discussion since 2012 no
Table 1: Wealth tax discussions and wealth tax reforms in selected OECD and OECD
key partner countries from 2004 to 2016
Sources: BMF (2016), Deloitte (2004-2015), EY (2015), IBFD (2016), KPMG (2004-2015), PwC (2004-2015).
Notes: Wealth taxes on selected property, like taxes on vehicles, real estate, etc. are not included in this table. Wealth tax
discussions and reforms have been considered since 2004.
The composition of total capital tax revenues varies substantially across countries. Al-
though wealth taxes are highly topical in many jurisdictions tax reform discussions,
wealth taxes, as the most general form of capital taxes, play a rather minor role in coun-
tries overall capital tax revenues. Nevertheless, capital taxes, especially asset-specic
taxes, such as real estate taxes and property taxes, contribute signicantly to public rev-
enues, as can be observed in Figure 1. For example, the share of property taxes exeeds
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10% of total tax revenues in Canada, Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States
(OECD 2015b).
Figure 1: Capital tax revenues in di¤erent OECD countries
Sources: OECD Revenue Statistics (2015b)
Obviously, even in those countries that do not levy a general wealth tax, capital taxes
are important. However, some public economists raise doubts about the e¤ectiveness of
capital taxes and suspect that capital taxation could depress investment, lead to capital
ight and cause e¢ ciency costs (for example, Auerbach and Hassett 2015).1 This in turn
could induce even lower total tax revenues than without capital taxation.
Against this background it is important to understand the investment e¤ects of stochastic
capital taxes at the micro level in a partial equilibrium setting. Our results are supposed
to serve as a foundation for estimations of the benets and costs of capital taxes and
should be embedded in a general equilibrium model in future research. In the following,
we investigate the impact of stochastic capital taxation and the inherent tax risk on the
1The e¤ects of wealth taxes have been controversally discussed in previous years. See, e.g., Balogh
(1964), Stiglitz (1969), Mieszkowski (1972), Thurow (1972), Bentick (1979), Mills (1981), Brennan and
Nellor (1982), Michalos (1988), Bird (1991), Burbidge (1991), Davies (1991), Mintz (1991), and Kocher-
lakota (2005).
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timing of risky investment from a decision-makers perspective. Our model assumes that
an investor may either invest immediately or postpone their investment. We regard the
time of investment as an appropriate proxy for an investors willingness to carry out risky
projects. In this sense our paper does not follow the Domar-Musgrave approach but
represents a real options paradigm.
Our results indicate that investors who carry out risky investments are sensitive towards
capital tax risk. We nd that capital tax uncertainty, especially valuation risk, a¤ects
investment decisions, even under risk neutrality. We identify conditions that induce ap-
parently paradoxical investment e¤ects, meaning counterintuitive results. In contrast to
well-known ndings in portfolio selection models, based on Domar and Musgrave (1944),
paradoxical e¤ects in our model may arise in the absence of risk aversion. These e¤ects can
be attributed to the impact of taxes on the value of exibility rather than portfolio-related
e¤ects. Surprisingly, we nd that if a tax regime is characterized by a low level of cap-
ital tax uncertainty, an increase in tax volatility, caused, for example, by intensied tax
reform discussions, may accelerate investments. Furthermore, high-growth investments
are likely to be postponed if they experience a capital tax cut. However, if capital tax
uncertainty is already high, further increases of uncertainty tend to delay investment. The
magnitude of this e¤ect depends on whether or not the capital tax is asset-specic. Thus,
broadening the capital tax base tends to accelerate investment for small volatilities and
to delay investment for large volatilities. Overall, it is ambiguous whether capital taxes
that are limited to specic assets, such as real estate are less likely to delay investment
than a general wealth tax.
Our ndings can be regarded as the lower bound of potential e¤ects to be expected under
risk aversion and thus suggest that capital tax uncertainty is likely to be even more
relevant under risk aversion. Our results indicate that capital tax risk can be substantial
and thus must not be neglected.
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Our model is the rst to study the investment timing e¤ects of capital tax uncertainty,
in particular of capital valuation uncertainty under conditions of irreversibility. We use a
general capital tax as a representative for di¤erent types of capital taxes such as taxes on
real estate, individual wealth taxes, and taxes on business property, etc. As some countries
also levy capital taxes at the corporate level,2 our approach can also be interpreted as a
study of the impact of corporate-level capital taxes on corporate investments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a review of the literature in
the next section, we introduce the model in section 3 and determine the critical invest-
ment threshold that indicates whether or not to implement a risky project. In section
4 we investigate, which parameters determine investment timing and under what condi-
tions apparently paradoxical timing e¤ects are likely. Section 5 summarizes and draws
conclusions.
2 Literature Review
Prior studies on the welfare e¤ects of uncertain tax policy indicate that removing all
uncertainty about future tax policy may lead to considerable welfare gains. For example,
Skinner (1988) estimates a welfare gain of 0.4 percent of national income for the United
States. Bizer and Judd (1989) highlight that the potential e¢ ciency costs of random
tax policy strongly depend on the characteristics of the random tax instrument. Other
studies show that tax policy uncertainty can be socially useful (Alm 1988). Although we
do not aim to draw conclusions about the aggregate e¤ects on investment, tax revenues
and wealth distribution, these ndings motivate us to scrutinize the e¤ects of stochastic
capital taxation from a micro-level perspective. Using an analytical model we nd that the
arising distortions with respect to investment decisions are multifold. These distortions are
not only highly dependent on the tax risks involved, but also dependent on the economic
2Countries with wealth taxation at the corporate level are, for example, Luxembourg and most Swiss
cantons.
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and tax environment.
Although there are means to shield taxpayers against some types of tax risks, usually tax
uncertainty cannot be resolved completely. To reduce the tax risk, taxpayers may request
ex ante rulings or letters of expertise from tax advisors or ask the tax authority to provide
a real-time audit (Beck and Lisowsky 2014) or even purchase an insurance against tax
risk (Logue 2005). Unfortunately, these instruments are typically either not available, not
feasible, too complicated, too imperfect in resolving uncertainty or too expensive (Givati
2009 and De Simone, Sansing, and Seidman 2013). Moreover, recent research indicates
that instruments such as advance tax rulings will often not be requested by taxpayers who
are exposed to high tax uncertainty (Diller, Kortebusch, Schneider, and Sureth 2016). All
this implies that capital tax assessments typically involve a signicant amount of tax risk
that arises from the estimation procedures and from unpredictable outcomes of tax audits.
Prior empirical research, such as Edmiston (2004), provides evidence for the negative im-
pact of tax uncertainty on investments. However, other theoretical and empirical inves-
tigations indicate that (prot or income) tax uncertainty could encourage or discourage
investment and risk taking (Hassett and Metcalf, 1999). For example, Beck and Jung
(1989) investigate the impact of prot tax uncertainty on investment behavior and re-
ported income. They analytically demonstrate that greater tax liability uncertainty may
either increase or decrease reported income. Furthermore, Agliardi (2001) and Niemann
(2011) identify ambiguous e¤ects of prot tax uncertainty on investment decisions in a real
option setting. Niemann (2011) also shows that if tax uncertainty is small compared to
cash ow uncertainty, and if both stochastic processes are positively correlated, increased
tax uncertainty may also accelerate investment. Jacob, Wentland, and Wentland (2016)
test empirically whether rm-specic prot tax uncertainty a¤ects rmstiming of large
investments. They nd that rms with high (low) tax rates face an upside (downside) tax
risk and accelerate (delay) investments upon an increase in tax uncertainty. Evidently,
tax uncertainty distorts investment behavior in a rather unpredictable way. Surprisingly,
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none of these studies accounts for capital taxes or capital tax uncertainty.
Among the few studies on capital taxes and their impact on investment decisions Dye,
McGuire, and Merriman (2001) nd evidence that high property tax rates lead to sig-
nicantly slower growth rates. Craft and Schmidt (2005) nd evidence for signicant
decreases in vehicular capital after changes in vehicle property taxes. Accordingly, Allee,
Lynch, Petroni, and Schroeder (2015) nd signicant sensitivities of petroleum reneries
in their crude oil inventories when investors are subject to a personal property tax. Hans-
son (2008) analyzes the abolishment or suspension of general wealth taxation in Austria in
1994, in Denmark in 1997, in Germany in 1997, and in the Netherlands in 2001. She nds
evidence for a small but perceptible impact of wealth tax abolishment on entrepreneurial
activity. Van Wijnbergen and Estache (1999) examine the impact of a minimum asset
tax, which is similar to a wealth tax, on high-risk rms using an option pricing approach
and a Monte Carlo simulation with Brazilian data. They nd that high-risk rms do not
seem to be hit harder by the underlying tax. Under specic conditions the introduction of
the minimum asset tax may even lower the marginal e¤ective tax rates. Their results are
in line with the wealth tax paradox that has been elaborated under certainty in Sureth
and Maiterth (2008) and under uncertainty in Niemann and Sureth-Sloane (2015). As a
consequence, the existing empirical studies only allow us to draw mixed conclusions. All
of them disregard capital tax uncertainty.
To understand the potential investment e¤ects of stochastic capital taxation, this stream
of literature has to be extended with respect to capital tax uncertainty. This is particularly
important, as capital taxation in existing tax systems turns out not to be (perfectly) cor-
related with prot taxation. While the e¤ects of stochastic prot (or income) taxation at
least to some extent have been investigated (Agliardi 2001, Niemann 2011, Diller, Korte-
busch, Schneider, and Sureth 2016), the e¤ects of stochastic capital (or property) taxation
have not yet been analyzed under conditions of cash ow uncertainty and irreversibility.
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Our results highlight the relevance of capital tax risk for investment decisions and provide
novel insights that contribute to the current discussion on re-introducing or extending
capital taxation. Capital tax risk may delay high-risk investment, especially as a reac-
tion to a newly introduced capital tax. To reduce unintended consequences of uncertain
tax policy, politicians and scal authorities should avoid too high levels of capital tax
uncertainty, which are likely to hinder innovative investment activities.
3 Model setup
Our model of investment is based on the framework provided by Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
that is frequently used for the analysis of tax e¤ects under uncertainty and irreversibility.3
In line with this body of literature we assume that a risk neutral investor4 has the option
to invest in an innitely-lived real investment project that yields stochastic cash ows.
For reasons of mathematical simplicity the option to invest is considered perpetual and
inherent to the investment opportunity. We abstract from acquired options. The return
on investment is subject to prot taxation. Moreover, the investment project can be
subject to stochastic capital taxation. The investor uses individual calculus for valuation
of both the project and the option to invest. We do not need to assume that the spanning
property holds, i.e., liquid markets for the assets do not necessarily exist. Thus, our
approach is more general and also captures investment projects that cannot be replicated
by traded assets. As long as the option to invest is not exercised, available funds yield the
risk-free capital market rate. If the option to invest is exercised, the investor gives up all
exibility and pays the acquisition cost for the project. There is no obligation to invest
within nite time. If the project conditions do not turn out to be su¢ ciently favorable,
3See, e.g., Niemann (1999), Sureth (2002), Panteghini (2004, 2005), Alvarez and Koskela (2008), Gries,
Prior and Sureth (2012).
4In contrast to research following Domar and Musgrave (1944), who assume risk averse investors
optimizing their mix of risk-free and risky investments, in our analysis uncertainty-induced distortions of
the timing of risky investments arise even under risk neutrality. Thus, we add two issues to the literature
that arise from capital tax uncertainty and have not been addressed so far: unexpected timing e¤ects of
random capital taxation and the distortive power of stochastic capital taxation even under risk neutrality.
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the investment project can be innitely postponed. We assume that the project is entirely
equity-nanced to separate the tax e¤ects on investment from the nancing e¤ects.
When investors try to estimate the total risk of investment projects, they should be aware
that operational or cash ow uncertainty is not the only source of uncertainty of such
projects. Rather, investors have to regard taxation as a random process from an ex ante
perspective. Integrating capital taxation as a stochastic process into investment models
seems to be an appropriate method to deal with uncertainty regarding the introduction or
the increase of a capital tax. It should be noted that stochastic capital taxation already
inuences decisions if only a discussion on tax reform takes place, even if a capital tax is
currently not (and possibly never) levied.
Since it is the aim of this paper to analyze the combined e¤ects of prot and capital
taxation on investment timing, the tax treatment of the investment project, the option
to invest, and the default alternative (i.e., wait and see) must be properly dened. We
consider only one level of taxation. This assumption means that the investor is either a
sole proprietor, partner in a private partnership or corporation that neglects shareholder
taxation.
As long as the investor waits and does not (yet) invest, they earn the risk-free pre-
tax interest rate r that is subject to the tax rate  r. In accordance with tax law in
several countries the tax rate on nancial income  r 2 [0; 1[ can di¤er from the general
prot tax rate.5 Financial assets like bank accounts or bonds that yield interest income
can be (and often are) subject to an additional capital taxation at the rate ! 2 [0; 1[.
The variable  2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of these nancial assets that is subject to
capital taxation. Thereby, we are able to model capital taxes that are asset-specic and
partially or completely exempt nancial assets from capital taxation. By dening  as
deterministic, we assume a deterministic capital tax base of nancial assets. As a result,
5Examples are countries such as Austria, Croatia, or Germany.
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the risk-free discount rate after taxes r that captures the default alternative is dened
as
r = (1   r) r   ! > 0: (1)
We assume that the after-tax discount rate is strictly positive. Otherwise, present values
could reach economically meaningless innite values.6
The parameter  also permits us to model di¤erent types of capital taxes and to analyze
their possible di¤erent investment e¤ects. If only special assets like real estate are subject
to tax while nancial assets are exempt from this type of capital tax, the parameter is
zero,  = 0. By contrast, if a general wealth tax including all types of assets is considered,
nancial assets are fully taxable and thus  = 1. As a consequence, broadening (narrow-
ing) the capital tax base can be represented by increasing (decreasing) the parameter
.
If the investor decides to exercise the option to invest and acquires the investment project,
they lose any further timing exibility and are bound to the project until innity. If the
project is in place, its only benets consist of the future cash ows. Stochastic operating
cash ows are subject to prot taxation that can also be regarded as a stochastic process.
Uncertainty of prot tax payments arises from random tax rates or random tax bases. In
order to focus on the e¤ects of capital taxation we do not model operating cash ows, prot
tax rates, and prot tax bases as separate stochastic processes. Instead, we summarize
operating cash ows less prot tax payments to a single stochastic process  (t).7
6Although negative nominal interest rates sometimes do exist, we leave this observation as a problem
for future research in nance. However, the combination of low interest rates and high wealth taxes may
lead to negative r : E.g., this is the case in Norway, where in 2015 interest rates of 0.5 % meet a wealth
tax on nancial assets of 1 %.
7This assumption implies that deductions for income tax purposes are only implicitly captured. How-
ever, the properties of the income tax base under uncertainty have been extensively analyzed in the
literature. See, e.g., Niemann (1999), Sureth (2002), Niemann and Sureth (2004, 2005). For stochastic
income tax rates see Niemann (2004). If we wanted to model cash ow uncertainty and prot tax un-
certainty separately, we would need to introduce two stochastic processes and an additional stochastic
process for wealth taxation. Although this might be fruitful in future research, we decided to focus on the
e¤ects from stochastic capital taxation and thus summarize operating cash ow uncertainty and prot
tax uncertainy to a single process.
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The capital tax base is determined by the value of tangible and intangible assets, such as
machinery, plant, real estate, vehicles, corporate stocks, patents etc., which are attribut-
able to the investment project. The capital tax has to be paid out of the preliminary
after-tax cash ow  (t). We assume that the capital tax base at time t, which is denoted
by W (t), is also a stochastic process. This assumption reects real-world tax bases quite
well if the capital tax base is dened as the fair value, i.e., the market value of the
assets attributable to an investment project. Here, cash ow uncertainty leads to capital
tax base uncertainty whenever the tax base is correlated with the stochastic cash ows
or if a portfolio of various valuation approaches is applicable. Moreover, even if the as-
sessment of the assets and herewith the capital tax base does not involve any uncertainty
because the legislator has dened a clear valuation procedure without any discretion in
valuation, uncertainty may arise, for example, from unclear denitions of taxable tangible
and intangible assets. This implies uncertainty with respect to the interpretation by the
scal authorities and thereby the outcome of a future tax audit.
In contrast to prot taxation, we model the capital tax rate and the capital tax base
separately, because the capital tax rate might also a¤ect the after-tax discount rate.
For reasons of mathematical simplicity, the capital tax rate ! (like the tax rate on
nancial income  r) is considered deterministic and constant. In the following, capital
tax uncertainty is completely captured in the random capital tax base. This approach
primarily addresses the uncertainty that arises from asset valuation. As a result, the total
after-tax cash ow  (t) is dened as
 (t) =  (t)  !W (t) : (2)
Since the investor is risk neutral the value of the project in place V at time t = 0 is
dened as the expected net present value
V = V (0) = E
Z 1
0
 (t) e
 r tdt

: (3)
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For further results the cash ow process and the capital tax base process have to be
dened. In accordance with prior literature (see Niemann 2011) we assume that the
operating cash ow after prot taxes  follows an exogenously given arithmetic Brownian
motion
d = dt+ dz; (4)
with  as the expected growth of cash ows after prot taxes,  as the standard
deviation, and dz as increment of a standardWiener process. In contrast to the geometric
Brownian motion that is frequently used in asset pricing and that always takes positive
values, an arithmetic Brownian motion allows us to describe prots as well as losses as
possible realizations of the random walk. As a more formal argument in favor of an
arithmetic Brownian motion it should be noted that the sum or the di¤erence of two
arithmetic Brownian motions is itself an arithmetic Brownian motion. A similar relation
does not hold for a geometric Brownian motion or other stochastic processes.8 To compute
the project value analytically it is further necessary to use a stochastic process that permits
closed-form expected values. The capital tax base W also follows an exogenously given
arithmetic Brownian motion. We abstract from capital tax jumps. The assumption of an
arithmetic Brownian motion implies that positive as well as negative values for capital
tax purposes are possible. The capital tax base may or may not be a function of past
cash ows. This unsigned tax base reects that deductions, such as provisions, liabilities,
and reserve liabilities can be attributable to an investment project. We assume symmetric
capital taxation of positive and negative values.
dW = !dt+ !dz!; (5)
with ! as the expected growth of the capital tax base, ! as the associated standard
deviation, and dz! as increment of a standard Wiener process. The growth and volatility
parameters ! and ! may signicantly di¤er from  and  of the after-tax cash ow
8Our approach implicitly assumes an immediate and complete loss o¤set for tax purposes. This means
that we abstract from loss o¤set restrictions for reasons of mathematical simplicity.
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process. It should be noted that the default alternative (i.e., wait and see) generates
deterministic cash ows (i.e., risk-free interest income) and a deterministic capital tax
base.
The capital tax base process of the risky project can be correlated with the rst process,
the cash ow process
E[dz dz!] =  dt; (6)
where  2 [ 1; 1] denotes the instantaneous correlation coe¢ cient of both arithmetic
Brownian motions. A perfect positive correlation ( = 1) means that the project value
for capital tax purposes perfectly reects the expected after-tax present value of the
project. This assumption is closely related to the existence of complete markets for the
investment project under consideration. Uncorrelated processes ( = 0) mean that the
capital tax base is independent of the expected present value of the project. This as-
sumption corresponds to the arbitrary valuation of real estate in several jurisdictions.9
Negative correlations ( < 0) are rather implausible because they would involve delib-
erately procyclical capital taxation.10 To depict real-world types of capital taxation, we
focus on the cases of uncorrelated or non-perfect positive (0   < 1) correlations.11
Being the di¤erence of two arithmetic Brownian motions, the after-tax cash ow  =
   !W is itself an arithmetic Brownian motion that can be represented by
d = dt+ dz; (7)
with  =    !! as the growth parameter of the total after-tax cash ow,  =p
2 + 
2
!
2
!   2!! as the combined standard deviation,12 and dz also the increment
9As an example, the tax value of real estate in Austria or in Germany (Einheitswert) is only weakly
related to market values.
10 can also be interpreted as a parameter that captures the tax audit risk. If the scal authorities
audit procyclically,  > 0 indicates an increase in tax audit risk with increased cash ow. If they audit
countercyclically  < 0 implies increased tax audit risk.
11To generalize our setting we do not assume a strict functional relation of cash ows and the capital
tax base. For correlations of  = 1 the wealth tax can also be intepreted as a (notional) prot tax.
12We use the standard deviation to model volatility. This operationalization is in line with a large
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of a standard Wiener process. If the stochastic processes are perfectly correlated ( = 1),
total volatility simplies to  =    !!. If capital tax base uncertainty is the only
source of uncertainty ( =  = 0), total volatility amounts to  = !!.
The assumption of arithmetic Brownian motions permits to write the expected after-tax
cash ow at time t as
E [ (t)] =  (0) +  t = 
0
 + (   !!) t: (8)
Consequently, the project value is
V = E
Z 1
0

0 + (   !!) t

e r tdt

=
0
r
+

r2
: (9)
Given the value of the investment project, the value of the option to invest can be deter-
mined. Since the investor can only decide between waiting and exercising the option, the
decision variable is binary and it is easily possible to determine the optimal investment
behavior. We will start with the waiting region in which the option is kept alive. As we
do not restrict our analysis by assuming a specic initial value of the capital tax base at
the time of decision making, we implicitly restrict the initial values such that the expected
after-tax present value of the project in the waiting region is below the critical investment
threshold, which is still to be determined.
The optimal transition to the exercise region will be modeled by boundary conditions.
We use dynamic programming to determine the option value.13
The option to invest does not generate any cash ows. In principle, an option could be
relevant for prot tax as well as capital tax purposes. For example, the increase or decrease
body of literature on di¤erent types of volatility. For recent studies that refer to tax volatility issue in
accounting see, e.g., De Simone and Stomberg (2013), Jacob and Schütt (2013), McGuire, Neuman and
Omer (2013) and Neuman, Omer and Schmidt (2016), Guenther, Matsunaga and Williams (2016).
13For a comparison of dynamic programming and contingent claims analysis and the resulting tax
e¤ects see Niemann and Sureth (2004, 2005).
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of the option value could be taxable or tax-deductible respectively.14 Alternatively, the
option value could be subject to capital taxation. However, tax systems in the real world
do not recognize mere business opportunities as taxable assets. Therefore, we neglect tax
consequences of the option to invest that might be relevant in ideal tax systems. Thus,
the options after-tax cash ow equals zero in the case considered here.
As long as the option is kept alive, its only benet is the expected increase in value. The
resulting equilibrium condition implies that the owner of the option expects an instan-
taneous return that equals the after-tax risk-free rate over an innitesimal time interval
dt
E [dF ]
!
= rdt: (10)
Application of Itôs lemma to the stochastic di¤erential dF and further transformation
yields the ordinary di¤erential equation15
1
2
2
d2F
d2
+ 
dF
d
  rFdt = 0 (11)
with the solution
F ( ) = Ae
 ; with  =  

2
+
s

2
2
+
2r
2
> 0; (12)
where A > 0 is a constant to be determined. From A;  > 0 it is obvious that F ( 1) =
0 holds. This condition means that an option on an underlying with innite negative value
is valueless.
The solution of the investment problem describes the investment threshold at which it
is optimal to exercise the option immediately. To derive this solution two free boundary
conditions are needed. The value matching condition requires that the projects benets
14Acquired real options like exploration rights, e.g., are depreciable under most tax regimes. Depreci-
ation deductions on the option to invest are necessary in some neutral tax systems. See Niemann (1999,
pp. 57, 61). Although real-world tax systems only account for depreciations on acquired options, overall
depreciation on (also non-acquired) options would be in line with fair value reasoning.
15Since the option to invest is perpetual, the time derivative vanishes here.
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and hence its expected present value must equal its costs, comprising the acquisition cost
and the abandoned option value, at the point of transition
V (

 )  1 != F ( ) : (13)
For reasons of simplicity, the acquisition costs are normalized to unity: I0 = 1. The
smooth pasting condition requires the identity of marginal benets and marginal costs at
the critical threshold
dV (

 )
d
!
=
dF (

 )
d
: (14)
Substituting and further transformation yields the critical investment threshold16
 = r  

r
+
1

: (15)
Equation (15) can be interpreted as follows. The expected present value of after-tax cash
ows (eq. 9) must reach the acquisition costs I0 = 1 of a project plus a exibility premium
1
 r
> 0 to cover the value of the option which is lost due to exercise.17 The variance-
dependent exibility premium implies that even risk neutral investors take uncertainty
into account for investment timing decisions.
4 Investment timing e¤ects of stochastic capital tax-
ation
The impact of stochastic capital taxation on investment timing can be determined by
computing the partial derivatives of the critical investment threshold  with respect to
the di¤erent capital tax parameters. These parameters are
 expected growth of the capital tax base !,
 correlation of capital tax base and operating cash ow after prot taxes ,
16For a similar critical investment threshold without wealth taxation see Niemann (2011), p. 9.
17For the interpretation of the exibility premium in scenarios with and without uncertainty under
irreversibility see Gries, Prior and Sureth (2012), pp. 530-532.
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 volatility of the capital tax base !,
 taxable fraction of nancial assets  (capital taxation of the default alternative),
and
 capital tax rate !.
In contrast to traditional (expected) NPV calculations the critical investment threshold in
a real options model takes into account that taxation not only a¤ects the cash ows from
an investment project, the default alternative as represented by the after-tax interest rate
and (potentially) the initial outlay, but also the value of timing exibility, i.e., the option
to invest. Thus, the tax e¤ect on the option value should be considered when analyzing
variations of tax parameters. Tax e¤ects on option values are one of the reasons why
results of real options models di¤er from those of portfolio selection models following
Domar and Musgrave (1944).
Proposition 1 Increasing the expected growth of the capital tax base ! unambiguously
increases the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The algebraic sign of the partial derivative is always positive:
@
@!
=
@
@|{z}
<0
 @
@!|{z}
<0
=
  
p
2 + 2
2
r
2r
p
2 + 2
2
r
( !) > 0: (16)
This result is intuitive (normal e¤ect). The higher the expected growth of the capital
tax base, the higher the expected present value of capital tax payments and hence the
critical investment threshold. Consequently, higher growth rates of the capital tax base
tend to delay investment. Stated di¤erently, the tax legislator can accelerate investment
by permitting depreciation for capital tax purposes (! < 0) rather than by prescribing
valuation approaches that lead to tax values increasing over time.
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Proposition 2 Increasing the correlation of the capital tax base and cash ows  unam-
biguously reduces the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The algebraic sign of the partial derivative is always negative.
@
@
=
@
@|{z}
>0
 @
@|{z}
<0
=
 !!p
2 + 2
2
r
< 0: (17)
Thus, a higher correlation of the stochastic processes reduces total volatility and hereby
accelerates investment (normal e¤ect). This result permits an immediate tax policy con-
clusion. A capital tax base that is closely related to fair values as measured by the
expected after-tax present value of a project (i.e.,  ! 1) accelerates investment com-
pared to an arbitrary valuation for capital tax purposes (i.e.,  = 0). We use the notion
of fair value in the sense of market valuation. We do not imply fair values as dened in
nancial accounting. Examples of the consequences can be seen in versions of the real
estate tax that have a weak association of tax base and market value. These types of
taxes tend to delay real estate investment compared to a fair value approach.
Proposition 3 Increasing the volatility of the capital tax base ! either increases or
reduces the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The partial derivative of  with respect to ! can take either algebraic sign:
@
@!
=
@
@|{z}
>0
 @
@!|{z}
R0
=
 2!!   !p
2 + 2
2
r
: (18)
An increase in total volatility increases the critical investment threshold (normal e¤ect).
This result is consistent with traditional option pricing theory, because increased (total)
volatility increases option values without changing expected cash ows of the project or
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the after-tax discount rate. However, increasing the volatility of the capital tax base !
has an ambiguous impact on total volatility  :
@
@!
8<:
>
=
<
9=; 0 , !!
8<:
>
=
<
9=; 
8<:
normaltax e¤ect
paradoxicaltax e¤ect
9=; : (19)
Thus, if the volatility of the capital tax base ! is small compared to cash ow volatility
, increased capital tax volatility ! tends to reduce total volatility  and hereby accel-
erates investment. Although we assume risk neutrality, an e¤ect similar to diversication
emerges. This apparently paradoxicalresult holds if the correlation coe¢ cient  is pos-
itive and su¢ ciently large. By contrast, if capital tax base uncertainty is the only source
of uncertainty ( = !! > 0 = ) only normaltiming e¤ects are possible. Normal
timing e¤ects also occur if the cash ow process and the tax base process are uncorrelated
( = 0). For a given positive correlation  > 0, cash ow volatility  > 0 and capital
tax rate !  0, an increase of the capital tax base volatility ! rst yields paradoxical
and then, from a critical capital tax base volatility level onward, normal tax e¤ects.
!
8<:
>
=
<
9=; ! , @@!

>0;>0;!>0
8<:
>
=
<
9=; 0: (20)
This result implies the following neutrality condition.
Corollary 1 Capital tax uncertainty does not a¤ect investment timing if !! = .
Thus, if the tax legislator does not intend to inuence investment timing by means of cap-
ital tax uncertainty but rather seeks for a timing neutral tax system, perfectly calibrated
tax and non-tax parameters are necessary to avoid undesired e¤ects. In actual or cur-
rently planned tax systems that are not characterized by project-specic rules, neutrality
is therefore highly unlikely.
With respect to the parameters  and ! we dene e¤ects of capital taxation as normal
if increasing capital taxation of the investment project increases the critical investment
threshold and if increasing capital taxation of nancial assets (default alternative) reduces
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the critical investment threshold, i.e., if @=@! > 0 or @

=@ < 0. Otherwise, for
@=@! < 0 or @

=@ > 0, we call tax e¤ects paradoxical.
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Proposition 4 Increasing the taxable fraction of nancial assets  either increases or
reduces the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The algebraic sign of the partial derivative is ambiguous.
@
@
=
@
@r
 @r
@r
 @r
@
=
@
@r
 1
@r
@r
 ( !) = @


@r|{z}
R0
  !
1   r| {z }
<0
(21)
with
@
@r
=
1   r
2r2
 
 + 2r
2
  
2 + 
2
rp
2 + 2
2
r
!
: (22)
Evaluating the partial derivatives in the limiting cases  ! 0 and  !1 yields
lim
!0
@
@
=  w < 0 lim
!1
@
@
=   !
2r2

 + 2r
2
   
r
r
2

= +1: (23)
From continuity with respect to   0 it follows that @@ < 0 for small volatilities and
@
@
> 0 for su¢ ciently high volatilities.
The special case of  = 0 further claries the ambiguity of e¤ects.
@
@

=0
= !
 s
2
8r3
  1
!8<:
>
=
<
9=; 0 , 2
8<:
>
=
<
9=; 8r3 : (24)
Hence, the occurance of normal or paradoxical capital tax e¤ects with respect to  strongly
depends on the levels of the discount rate and capital tax uncertainty. For su¢ ciently
high after-tax discount rates r and small volatilities 2 , normal tax e¤ects prevail. As a
consequence, for high pre-tax interest rates, real-world levels of the nancial income tax
rate  r, and low or moderate levels of the capital tax rate !, the partial derivative @=@
is negative, which means that increasing the taxable fraction of nancial assets reduces
the critical investment threshold and hence accelerates real investment. This e¤ect is
plausible, because increasing  does not a¤ect cash ows from investment and only reduces
18For paradoxical income tax e¤ects see, e.g., Niemann and Sureth (2013).
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the after-tax discount rate r . Therefore, the present value of the investment project V
increases in . As an additional e¤ect of increasing  the lower discount rate typically
reduces the option value, making immediate investment more attractive. An increased
project value and a reduced option value both contribute to accelerated investment.
However, with after-tax discount rates su¢ ciently close to zero, increasing  increases the
critical investment threshold so that a paradoxical capital tax e¤ects occurs. In these
cases, increasing  reduces the discount rate such that the expected present value of
capital taxes increases relatively more than the present value of cash ows. Moreover, for
low or negative growth parameters  , high volatilities, and low discount rates, the critical
investment threshold tends to increase with a higher taxable fraction  (or, equivalently,
with a lower discount rate), because for these parameter combinations the option value
decreases faster than the project value.
As apparently paradoxical timing e¤ects are likely for high total volatility and/or low
discount rates, the tax legislator should consider these cases and should estimate their
relative impact on overall investments and thus taxable assets in the economy when de-
ciding on which type of capital tax to implement. When a tax on special non-nancial
assets like real estate is already in place ( = 0), broadening the capital tax base by in-
creasing the taxable fraction of nancial assets may induce unexpected (and unintended)
investment responses when total volatility is high. A similar result can emerge when a
general wealth tax ( = 1) is narrowed to a tax on special non-nancial assets by reducing
. From a tax policy perspective these possible results could be important determinants
of revenues from capital taxes and indirectly also of prot tax revenues.
Corollary 2 Varying  always yields e¤ects opposite to those from varying the pre-tax
interest rate r (see eq. (21)).
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Whereas the project value V decreases when the interest rate increases, the option value
F may increase, decrease, or remain constant.19
The e¤ects of varying the capital tax rate ! are similar to a simultaneous increase of the
growth parameter ! and of the default alternative parameter  because the capital tax
rate a¤ects the net cash ows of the investment project as well as the default alternative,
represented by the after-tax interest rate r . Since Proposition 4 implies that a variation
of  induces ambiguous timing e¤ects, a similar result can be expected from a variation of
!. However, this e¤ect is mitigated by the expected increase of the capital tax payment,
as can be derived from Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 Increasing the capital tax rate ! either increases or reduces the critical
investment threshold.
Proof. The algebraic sign of the partial derivative is ambiguous
@
@!
=
p
2 + 2
2
r   

(!r    ) + r2 + 2r2
h
! (!!   )  
p
2 + 2
2
r
i
2r2
p
2 + 2
2
r| {z }
R0
:
(25)
In the limiting case without tax base uncertainty (! = 0), and thus cash ow uncertainty
only, the partial derivative simplies to
@
@!

!=0
=
>0z }| {p
2 + 2r
2
   
 R0z }| {
(!r   ) 
0z}|{
r
R0z }| {
2r
p
2 + 2r
2
   2

2r2
p
2 + 2r
2
| {z }
>0
; (26)
which can take either algebraic sign, as can be shown for  = ! = 0
@
@!

=!=!=0
= 
 
p
8r3
  1
!8<:
>
=
<
9=; 0 , 2
8<:
>
=
<
9=; 8r3 : (27)
19The non-monotonicity of the option value with respect to the interest rate follows from the assumption
of an arithmetic Brownian motion. When a geometric Brownian motion is used, call option values increase
with increasing interest rates. See Hull (2015), p. 237.
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Thus, for 2 < 8r
3
 paradoxical capital tax rate e¤ects occur. By contrast, for extreme
tax base uncertainty we obtain normal e¤ects
lim
!!1
@
@!
= +1; (28)
regardless of the levels of , !, and . Continuity with respect to !  0 implies that
@
@!
< 0 for small volatilities and @


@!
> 0 for su¢ ciently high volatilities.
Corollary 3 Under su¢ ciently high pre-tax interest rates paradoxical capital tax rate
e¤ects prevail.
Proof. In the limiting case r ! 1 the algebraic sign of the partial derivative is always
non-positive:
lim
r!1
@
@!
=    0: (29)
Here, the capital tax-exempted option value clearly favors the real investment over the
default alternative. In contrast to paradoxical e¤ects identied in prior literature under
certainty (Wagner and Dirrigl 1980, Sureth and Maiterth 2008) this e¤ect is caused by
uncertainty and exibility.
Numerical examples further clarify that either algebraic sign of @=@! is possible. In
the following, we show which e¤ect prevails under certain conditions. One of the major
determinants of the capital tax e¤ect is the growth parameter  . For increasing net
cash ows ( > 0), increasing capital tax rates tend to reduce the critical investment
threshold. If the expected level of after-tax cash ows decreases over time ( < 0)
increasing capital tax rates tend to delay investment. These opposing e¤ects are shown
for the parameter setting r = 0:04,  = 0:04 (left hand side),  =  0:04 (right hand
side), ! = 0,  = 0:1, ! = 1,  = 0,  r = 0:25,  = 1 in Figure 2.20
20It should be noted that the values for  and ! typically di¤er substantially, because  is the
volatility of cash ows, which can be regarded as the return from an investment into assets, whereas !
denotes the volatility of the capital tax base, i.e. the assessed invested assets.
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Figure 2: Critical investment threshold as a function of the capital tax rate !
for r = 0:04, ! = 0,  = 0:1, ! = 1,  = 0,  r = 0:25 and  = 1
If the default alternative is capital tax-exempt ( = 0), which represents the case of a
special asset tax, expression (25) simplies to
@
@!

=0
=
R0z}|{
!
>0z }| {p
2 + 2
2r   

+2r
R0z }| {
! (!!   )
2r
p
2 + 2
2r| {z }
>0
: (30)
Even for this capital tax-exempt default alternative, increasing the capital tax rate can
either accelerate or delay investment, although numerical examples indicate that normal
e¤ects are much more likely. The ambiguity of the e¤ect depends on the correlation of the
stochastic processes as can be seen from the numerical example r = 0:04,  = ! = 0,
 = 0:1, ! = 1,  = 1 (left hand side),  = 0 (right hand side),  r = 0:25,  = 0 in
Figure 3. In this special case, however, variations of the capital tax rate ! are almost
negligible, as can be observed from the small-scale di¤erences of the ordinate values,
especially for  = 0. In the latter case, the partial derivative reduces to
@
@!

!===0
=
2!!p
2 + 2
2r
> 0; (31)
so that paradoxical tax e¤ects cannot be observed any more.
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Figure 3: Critical investment threshold as a function of the capital tax rate !
for r = 0:04,  = ! = 0,  = 0:1, ! = 1;  r = 0:25 and  = 0
We can estimate the overall relevance of capital tax uncertainty by comparing the critical
investment threshold with (! > 0) and without capital tax uncertainty (! = 0) for
di¤erent values of the capital tax rate. As an example with the parameters r = 0:04,
 = ! = 0,  = 0:1,  = 0,  r = 0:25 and  = 1, the solid line in Figure 4 shows  for
the case with high capital tax uncertainty (! = 2:5), the dashed line for deterministic
capital taxes (! = 0). We nd that for small capital tax rates, capital tax uncertainty
does not a¤ect investment timing signicantly, because total uncertainty is dominated
by cash ow uncertainty. For higher capital tax rates, however, neglecting capital tax
uncertainty would induce major mistakes in investment timing, as the di¤erence of critical
investment thresholds may reach as much as 10% of the initial value.
Figure 4: Critical investment thresholds as a function of the capital tax rate !
for r = 0:04,  = ! = 0,  = 0:1, ! 2 f0; 2:5g,  = 0,  r = 0:25 and  = 1
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Figure 5 shows the critical investment threshold if capital taxes are the only random
variable ( = 0, ! 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g), all else as in Figure 4. The thick solid line represents
the case ! = 1, the thick dashed line ! = 2, the thin solid line ! = 3, and the thin
dotted line ! = 4. In this setting, the capital tax rate considerably a¤ects the investment
timing decision. The impact of the capital tax rate can di¤er dramatically for di¤erent
levels of capital tax uncertainty and is stronger for higher capital tax uncertainty in this
example. As a consequence, investors and tax legislators should account for capital tax
uncertainty especially if cash ow uncertainty is low. It is obvious that careful estimations
of the degree of capital tax uncertainty are necessary for correctly anticipating the impact
of capital tax rate adjustments.
Figure 5: Critical investment thresholds as a function of the capital tax rate !
for r = 0:04,  = ! = 0,  = 0, ! 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g,  = 0,  r = 0:25 and  = 1
Summing up the tax rate analysis, apparently paradoxical capital tax rate e¤ects (@=@! <
0) are more likely for
 high pre-tax interest rates (r !1),
 high volatilities (! !1),
 high positive correlations (! 1),
 increasing cash ows ( > 0),
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 high taxation of the default alternative ( ! 1).
Our results show that identical tax policy actions may yield very di¤erent economic results,
which particularly depend on the expected cash ow structure and volatility of the project
or industry under consideration. Whatever the tax legislators objectives may be, it is
unlikely that they can be reached by capital taxes, given the ambiguity of investment
e¤ects. The tax legislator should therefore state explicitly which type of investment e¤ect
is considered desirable. If, for example, investment by high-tech rms with (typically)
increasing cash ows and high risks ( > 0,   0) should be encouraged, reducing the
capital tax rate would likely be dysfunctional.
5 Conclusions and implications
We analyze the impact of capital tax uncertainty on timing decisions of risky investments.
Capital tax uncertainty is typically caused either by tax policy uncertainty or uncertainty
in the outcome of tax audits. The valuation of assets in tax audits often leads to adjust-
ments of the capital tax base. This uncertainty in tax assessment has to be anticipated
when making an investment decision. An uncertain tax environment is currently created
by the mere possibility of future new or increased capital taxes such as wealth or property
taxes. Thus, irrespective of the actual future design of a capital tax, it is the threat of new
capital taxes, or an increase in existing capital taxes that may already cause uncertainty.
If assets generate stochastic cash ows, the fair value of these assets as measured by present
values is also stochastic. Thus, cash ow uncertainty induces capital tax base uncertainty
whenever the tax base is correlated with the stochastic cash ows. Additional capital
tax uncertainty arises from unclear denitions of taxable tangible and intangible assets
or when the tax law permits valuation discretion.
By modelling the volatility of the capital tax base as a proxy for all types of capital tax
uncertainty we are the rst to identify the distortive power of stochastic capital taxes
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on risky investments. We nd that capital tax volatility ambiguously a¤ects investment
timing. As normally expected, increased overall volatility decelerates risky investments
due to the increased option value. Increased capital tax volatility, however, may either
accelerate or delay investment. Unexpectedly, as long as capital tax uncertainty does not
exceed a certain critical level, increases in tax volatility accelerate investment implying
an increase in the investors propensity to carry out risky projects. Furthermore, for high
correlations and high cash ow uncertainty, even low levels of capital tax uncertainty can
generate paradoxical investor reactions. This nding is interesting for political debates
because it sheds light on the importance of unexpected investor reactions when designing
or reforming capital taxes.
The relevance of this e¤ect is supported by our sensitivity analysis of the interaction of
volatility and the correlation of the capital tax base and operating cash ows. Increasing
the correlation of cash ows and asset values reduces the critical investment threshold and
hence accelerates investment. Ceteris paribus, this result somewhat surprisingly implies
that fair value accounting for capital tax purposes, which is supposedly correlated with
cash ows may be less harmful for real investment than historical cost valuation, which
is at best weakly related to cash ows.
Our model and our numerical analysis provide insights for the design of capital taxes in
general. We show that specic capital taxes like pure property taxes generally induce
di¤erent investment timing e¤ects than a general wealth tax that also taxes nancial
assets. Our model reveals that broadening the capital tax base from a special asset tax
to a general wealth tax unexpectedly delays risky investment if total volatility is high and
interest rates are low. This result helps us to understand that general wealth taxes are
much more vulnerable to generate paradoxical investor behavior and thereby counteract
tax policy intentions. In this respect, our ndings explain the empirical nding that many
countries levy property taxes while only a limited number of countries levies wealth taxes.
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Furthermore, changes in the capital tax rate can induce either normal or paradoxical
investment timing e¤ects. For high-growth investments the critical investment threshold
decreases after an increase of the capital tax rate, which can be interpreted as a paradoxical
acceleration. Further conditions that favor paradoxical capital tax rate e¤ects are high
pre-tax interest rates, high volatilities, and high positive correlations. In contrast, for
su¢ ciently low cash ow growth rates, normal reactions are more likely to prevail.
Our results indicate that the tax legislator should be aware of the distortive power of capi-
tal tax uncertainty. The large number of parameters that facilitate paradoxical investment
responses indicates that such paradoxical tax e¤ects are likely to occur. Therefore, it is
doubtful whether the tax legislators e¢ ciency and redistributive objectives can be reached
by capital taxes.
Our analysis is subject to several limitations. We use a purely partial analytical model,
which does not allow politicians to draw conclusions about the overall revenue and distri-
butional e¤ects. Rather, our analysis of investment e¤ects should precede an estimation
of capital tax revenues. Furthermore, our decision-maker perspective is still characterized
by several restrictive assumptions. For example, we abstract from e¤ects of various -
nancing channels but focus on equity nancing only. Consequently, nancial constraints,
tax shields from interest deductions, and liquidity considerations are disregarded in the
model. However, debt nancing can be implicitly included in our model, assuming that
debt-related payments are already included in the cash ows.
Moreover, we abstract from cross-border issues, which are often assumed to o¤er substan-
tial tax avoidance potential. We neglect compliance costs that are likely to increase in
tax uncertainty. Like most previous studies from the real options literature we restrict
our study to risk neutral investors. We therefore conjecture that our results on the ef-
fects of capital tax uncertainty represent a lower bound for such e¤ects on risk averse
decision-makers.
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It should be noted, that it is not self-evident to what extent the tax legislator can actually
inuence tax uncertainty. Whereas high-frequency tax reforms and tax audit uncertainty
are certainly the result of scal activities, many tax reform discussions are triggered by
lobbyists rather than by deliberate governmental action.
For future research on tax e¤ects under both cash ow and tax uncertainty, our model can
be extended with respect to debt nancing, compliance costs, di¤erent attitudes towards
risk or more complex tax rules. Moreover, our model is well suited to capture the e¤ects
of value added tax (VAT) uncertainty. Since many tax authorities are reluctant to refund
input VAT, net VAT payment is a stochastic process that is subject to tax authorities
discretion. If investments are high, denial of input VAT refund can threaten a rms
existence. As a consequence, VAT uncertainty is likely to a¤ect investment behavior.
As our ndings are purely theoretical we think it is even more interesting to derive testable
hypotheses for empirical or quasi-experimental investigations. Although timing e¤ects of
real investment are notoriously hard to observe, investment spikes might serve as a proxy
for investment timing reactions to a tax reform and can be used in event studies. Recent
capital tax reforms or reform discussions such as the intensive pre-election discussions
on reintroducing a wealth tax in 2003-2005 and 2012-2013 in Germany, the introduction
of a new valuation approach for the German real estate tax in 2009, the 2012 and 2013
wealth tax reforms in France, and the 2006 and subsequent wealth tax reforms in Norway
can serve as events for a quasi-experimental setting and open our research question to an
empirical investigation.
31
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